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Diversity of views drives the Committee to adopt an eclectic approach and thus serves to limit
the risk that a single viewpoint or analytical framework might become unduly dominant. –
Bernanke (2007)
Most central banks take monetary policy decisions by committee. Committee in this context is not a
well-defined organizational concept but refers loosely to a group of people taking decisions. Differences
between committees relate to the decision protocol, the (in)formal hierarchy, the size and to the compo-
sition. One key difference is the composition of committees. In this paper we focus on the composition
and how the diversity of views are related to and influenced by the composition of the committee. Some
committees consist mainly of career central bankers who have extensive experience at the central bank,
whereas other committees consist mostly of external members recruited outside of the central bank.
Besley, Meads, and Surico (2008) argue that the internal-external dichotomy could matter for at least
two reasons. First, the selection procedure for internal and external members is in many cases formally
different. Second, career concerns could affect incentives. Externals leave after their terms whereas in-
ternal members may be building a further career in central banking. Also the backgrounds of committee
members differ. Experience in the financial industry, at an NGO or with the government may influence
how these committee members approach monetary policy making.
We examine the voting record of the Bank of England. We use the observed votes to infer the policy
preferences of the central bankers. With these policy preferences we can compare internals with externals
and gauge the impact of career backgrounds. To analyze the voting record we estimate the policy pref-
erences or ideal points of monetary policy committee members. The methodology we use, builds upon
a spatial voting model. A spatial voting model is a rational choice model of voting. Utilities are defined
as functions of the distance between the preferred outcome and alternatives in a policy space, hence the
name spatial voting model. We derive a basic version of this model and discuss how to estimate such a
model.
The model we use is unidimensional. The latent dimension on which we classify monetary policy commit-
tee members is called a dove-hawk dimension. We present two main results. First we show that internals
are not more hawkish than externals (or vice versa). This is related to a debate in the literature on
voting at the Bank of England where some researchers claim that internal members tend to be more
hawkish whereas other researchers argue that this is not the case. Our results support the latter strand
of the literature.1 However, we find that internals tend to have centrist policy preferences whereas as
the most pronounced policy preferences (very dovish or very hawkish) are nearly always held by external
members.
Our second result is that the policy preferences are not systematically influenced by career backgrounds.
The median voter does not change substantially when we consider monetary policy committee members
with different career backgrounds. However, career backgrounds seem to be related to the heterogeneity
in policy preferences. We find less variation in policy preferences among monetary policy committee
members with a central bank background than among monetary policy committee members with a
background in academia or the (non-financial) industry. This result suggests that there are meaningful
differences among monetary policy committee members which are driven by career backgrounds. The low
heterogeneity in preferences among committee members with a central bank background is suggestive of
an organizational consensus.
The methodology in this paper builds upon developments in other disciplines. We devote some space
to introduce the standard spatial voting model and we suggest a modification to deal with the data we
encounter in our application. We show how spatial voting models can easily be estimated with Bayesian
1This finding is in line with Besley, Meads, and Surico (2008), Hix, Hoyland, and Vivyan (2010) but contradicts
Gerlach-Kristen (2009), Bhattacharjee and Holly (2010) and Hansen, McMahon, and Rivera (2013).
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methods. Throughout our empirical analysis we demonstrate the flexibility of the methodology when
analyzing voting data. It is our hope that economists consider this methodology when analyzing voting
data.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section discusses the literature. In Section 3 we explain
what a spatial voting model is and how such a model can be estimated. We also discuss issues related
to identification. In Section 4 we introduce the data. We explain how the dataset was constructed and
comment on the raw data. We argue that a modification of the standard approach is needed because the
dataset is small which may exacerbate the influence of outliers. In Section 5 we provide the estimation
results. We present some model checks which make clear where the model fits well and where the model
performs worse. Here we also assess the robustness of the model. In Section 6 we use the estimated ideal
points to evaluate some claims in the literature. We compare internal and external monetary policy com-
mittee members. In Section 7 we explore whether policy preferences are driven by career backgrounds.
In Section 8 we conclude.
1 Related literature
This paper fits into the literature on decision taking at central bank committees. The institutional
arrangements of monetary policy committees differ considerably across central banks and may have im-
portant implications for monetary policy making in practice. These institutional details concern (i) the
way decisions are reached, (ii) the transparency of procedures and (iii) the composition of such a com-
mittee. Researchers have tried to provide theoretical and empirical arguments for the best institutional
design. Riboni and Ruge-Murcia (2010) consider the theoretical and empirical implications of three dif-
ferent voting protocols. They find that the consensus protocol where a level of support is required that
exceeds simple majority (super-majority voting), to be the best protocol. This conclusion is in line with
Dal Bo (2006) who also suggests super-majority voting as a way to combine flexibility and commitment
in monetary policy decision making.
Sibert (2003) finds that not publishing individuals’ votes lowers expected social welfare. Meade and
Stasavage (2008) investigate the costs associated with transparency on decisions. They find that greater
transparency may come at the cost of voters revealing private information less easily when deliberations
are behind closed doors. Their theoretical argument, for which they find evidence at the FOMC, builds
upon reputational concerns. The potential adverse effects of reputational concerns are also studied by
Visser and Swank (2007). Swank, Swank, and Visser (2008) show that increased transparency may in-
duce pre-meetings in order to conceal disagreement.
In this paper we focus on the composition of a monetary policy committee and on the heterogeneity in
policy preferences among the individual members. We consider whether different types of members hold
systematically different policy preferences.
Existing empirical research on this topic uses mainly one of two approaches. On the one hand researchers
estimate aggregate and individual interest rate rules. Besley, Meads, and Surico (2008) estimate reac-
tion functions for the individual committee members and assess the extent to which these capture the
heterogeneity in voting patterns. They group the committee members according to career background
(e.g. academia vs non-academia) and according to their appointment within the committee (external or
internal member). The parameters of the individual members are then compared across groups. The
authors find that while there is substantial heterogeneity in voting patterns, the individual reaction func-
tions are fairly homogenous with no significant differences between members according to the background
characteristics considered. Other examples of this approach studying the Bank of England are Riboni
and Ruge-Murcia (2008) and Harris and Spencer (2009).
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The other dominant approach builds upon a regression framework where the dependent variable captures
the votes cast by members. This dependent variable is then regressed on relevant meeting characteristics
(variables capturing economic conditions) and voter characteristics (backgrounds of the individual vot-
ers). As an example, Harris, Levine, and Spencer (2011) examine the frequency and type of dissenting
votes in the monetary policy committee at the Bank of England. While they find strong heterogeneity in
voting patterns, they only find a weak role for career experience in determining the decision to dissent.
These findings stand in contrast to the large literature studying votes at the FOMC suggesting that
career backgrounds do matter as well as political influence through appointment, see the discussion in
Harris, Levine, and Spencer (2011) and see Chappell, Havrilesky, and McGregor (1993) for early evidence
on the appointment channel.
We use an alternative way to investigate voting behavior of monetary policy committee members. The
approach builds on methodological advancements in other disciplines where researchers have investigated
voting behavior of legislators and judges. We estimate spatial voting models for explaining the voting
behavior of members of the monetary policy committee of the Bank of England. Our spatial framework
yields the revealed policy preferences (ideal points) of each monetary policy committee member, which
can be depicted as points on a latent dove-hawk dimension. Armed with these individual preferences we
are able to tackle a variety of questions posed in the literature on decision making in monetary policy
committees. The methodology yields a convenient to use and intuitive measure of policy preferences.
Moreover, the Bayesian method that we employ yields a joint posterior distribution of all the parameters.
This makes our approach much more flexible then the approaches discussed above. We demonstrate this
flexibility throughout the paper by investigating and making inference about derived quantities in a way
that would be nearly infeasible with the approaches discussed above. While economists have greatly
contributed to the development of the theoretical underpinnings of the spatial voting model since the
pioneering work by Black (1948), empirical implementations of the spatial voting model remain scant
within economics. An early contribution is the paper by Heckman and Snyder (1997) which is an influ-
ential methodological contribution with an application to legislative data but by now outdated for the
purpose of estimating ideal points, see also Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers (2004). Henry and Mourifié
(2013) test the spatial voting model in the context of US national elections. The few empirical papers
we are aware of nearly always consider applications in politics and the analysis of judicial votes.2 In this
paper we focus on voting data of monetary policy committees. There is one other paper that empirically
investigates voting at a monetary policy committee in a spatial voting framework, see Hix, Hoyland,
and Vivyan (2010). Their analysis looks at the voting process through the lens of political economy.
Specifically they explore the extent to which the (political) appointment process was able to move the
median voter. Our contribution is to connect the ideal point approach with the existing research in
(monetary) economics, adapt the methodology and widen the scope of the approach. After presenting
a concise introduction to this approach, we show how this methodology can (and should) be adapted to
the data available in the study of decisions by monetary policy committees. We subsequently present
tools for model checking to assess the robustness of the results.
2Recently, the empirical analysis of voting data regained attention of economists. Authors have proposed different
equilibrium models of decision making. The idea is that some of these traditional areas of application (such as voting in
supreme courts) have peculiar features (e.g. strategic voting) which require a modified methodology. These papers typically
do not build upon a spatial voting model. As an example, Iaryczower and Shum (2012) examine voting behavior in the US
supreme court and build an equilibrium model of decision making to quantify the value of information. Iaryczower, Lewis,
and Shum (2013) also look at the US supreme courts and investigate the trade-off between politicians and bureaucrats.
While the standard spatial voting model assumes sincere voting, this assumption can be relaxed. In the application we
consider in this paper there is no particular reason why strategic voting would be an issue. This also discussed in Blinder
(2007). Explicitly allowing for strategic voting in our framework could be done along the lines of Clinton and Meirowitz
(2004).
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2 Voting records and ideal point estimation
The approach presented in this paper starts from voting records from central bank committee de-
liberations. Our goal is to estimate the policy preferences of each member. To do so, we borrow from
statistical methods developed for analyzing political roll calls and decisions at judicial courts. These
methods are rooted in the psychometric literature and in educations research but can be motivated by a
spatial voting model. The spatial voting model itself has its roots in political economy, see Black (1948),
but was further developed in political science, see Enelow and Hinich (1984).
2.1 Ideal points and a spatial voting model
The data we analyze consist of voting records of monetary policy deliberations. For a given central
bank we observe the votes casted on a policy rate. The data consist of monetary policy committee
members to whom we refer as voters n = 1, . . . , N voting on policy choices t = 1, . . . , T . Each policy
choice t presents voters with a choice between a dovish position ψt and a hawkish position ζt, locations
in a one-dimensional Euclidean policy space R. A voter n choosing the hawkish position ζt on policy
choice t is denoted as ynt = 1. If voter n chooses the dovish position ψt, we code this as ynt = 0.
It is important to realize that both choices ζt and ψt are functions of a policy rate and of variables
capturing the contemporaneous economic conditions prevailing at policy choice t. However both choices
differ only in the policy rate with ζt being the more restrictive choice i.e. the higher policy rate of
the two. Assume that voters have quadratic utility functions over the policy space such that Un(ζt) =
−‖xn − ζt‖2 + ηnt and Un(ψt) = −‖xn − ψt‖2 + νnt, where xn ∈ R is the ideal point or the underlying
monetary policy preference of voter n and ηnt, νnt are the stochastic elements of utility and ‖.‖ denotes
the Euclidean norm.3 Utility maximization implies that ynt = 1 if Un(ζt) > Un(ψt) and ynt = 0
otherwise.
To derive an item response specification, we need to assign a distribution to the errors. Assuming a
type-1 extreme value distribution leads to a logit model with unobserved regressors xn corresponding to
the ideal points of the voters:4
P (ynt = 1) = P (Un(ζt) > Un(ψt))
= P
(




(νnt − ηnt) < 2(ζt − ψt)xn + (ψ2t − ζ2t )
)
= logit−1(βtxn − αt) (1)
The last line follows from substituting 2(ζt − ψt) with βt and substituting (ζ2t − ψ2t ) with αt.
To understand these coefficients, start by considering the situation where βt equals 1. Then the model
reduces to:
P (ynt = 1) = logit
−1(xn − αt). (2)
[Figure 1 about here.]
Figure 1 provides an illustration of the simplified model (βt = 1) as shown in equation 2 with two
voters and two meetings. Voter 1 has an ideal point x1 slightly smaller than zero, whereas Voter 2 has
3This framework is readily extended to a multidimensional policy space Rd with d-dimensional ideal points and positions.
All methods presented here are valid in the multidimensional case. However the intuition quickly becomes more difficult
and identification harder as we discuss in subsection 2.2. We return to the choice for one latent dimension in detail later
on.
4The logit specification seems to be the more popular approach but we could just as well have assumed a joint normal
distribution for the errors which results in a probit specification with unobserved regressors xn. An example of the latter
approach is Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers (2004). Substantially this does not matter.
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an ideal point x2 larger than two. The dove-hawk dimension runs from dovish to hawkish and so x2
would be a clear hawk here. Both voters have an ideal point larger than the vote-difficulty parameter α1
associated with Meeting 1. This implies that both voters are more likely to vote for the hawkish policy
option in this meeting since for n = 1, 2 we have that logit−1(xn−α1) > 0.5. However, the ideal point of
Voter 2 is larger than the ideal point of Voter 1 so the predicted probability of voting hawkish is larger
for Voter 2. Now consider Meeting 2. For this meeting we have x1 = α2, the ideal point of Voter 1 and
the vote-difficulty parameter of this meeting are equal. We find that logit−1(x1−α2) = logit−1(0) = 0.5.
There is an equal probability that Voter 1 chooses the hawkish or the dovish option in this meeting.
Once again, Voter 2 has an ideal point larger than α2 and so we give this voter a higher probability of
voting for the hawkish policy choice. These examples show that the vote-difficulty parameter captures
meeting characteristics and determines how likely it is a priori that voters vote for the dovish or the
hawkish policy choice.
Now consider the effect of βt or the discrimination parameter. This parameter captures the extent to
which preferences in the dove-hawk dimension determine the choice between two competing policy rate
proposals. Say we find that for a certain meeting t, βt equals zero. Then βtxn equals zero and the pref-
erences in the underlying dove-hawk dimension do not have an impact on the choice between competing
policy proposals. Analogously, a negative βt implies that doves (hawks) have a higher probability of
choosing the hawkish (dovish) policy choice. A Voter n is as likely to choose the dovish as the hawkish
choice if his ideal point xn equals αt/βt. This ratio is referred to as the cutpoint, the point in the policy
space where voters are indifferent between two policy choices presented in meeting t. We return to the
intuition behind these parameters in 4.1 where we discuss estimates of this parameter in the context of
our empirical application.
We acknowledge that voting could depend on a whole range of influences: personal preferences, group
preferences (e.g. through an organizational consensus, varying reputational concerns). Identifying each
of these requires considerably more data and/or assumptions. The measures of revealed policy prefer-
ences we propose in this paper, represented by the ideal points, are therefore a mix of these influences
on monetary policy voting rather than a literal measure of policy preference.5 In our opinion these serve
as a useful summary of policy preferences and could aid researchers analyzing monetary policy votes.
2.2 Identification
Identification of the parameters requires some special attention. There are two identification issues
with the model as presented in equation 1. As can be seen in Figure 1, the probabilities depend on the
relative position of ideal points and vote-difficulty parameters. We could add a constant to βtxn and
to αt and the predictions would not change. This is referred to as additive aliasing. Analogously we
could multiply βt by a constant and divide xn by the same constant. This is referred to as multiplicative
aliasing. In a unidimensional spatial context, identification is easier resolved than in a multidimensional
model, see Rivers (2003) for a detailed description of the issues involved in general spatial models. In a
unidimensional model two linearly independent a priori restrictions are sufficient. For example we could
simply fix two ideal points at arbitrary positions, e.g. one voter at -1 and another voter at +1. Fixing
two voters in this way forces the model to position the ideal points of the other votes relative to these
two voters. However, the results may be hard to interpret depending on the choice of ideal points which
were fixed.6
Another, more often used approach is to constrain the ideal points to have mean zero and a standard
5See also the discussion in Jackman (2009) p.458-459.
6For example if we would fix two ideal points of voters who have a very dovish voting record to be -1 and +1. Then
the other ideal points would be stretched out below -1 or above +1 and it would be hard to figure out when ideal points
become centrist or hawkish.
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deviation of one (when using normal priors on the ideal points). This facilitates interpretation but ensures
only local identification, see Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers (2004). The left-right direction can still be
reversed. To achieve (global) identification one needs to fix the direction. To achieve global identification
we explore two different approaches. One approach builds upon the way we coded the data and restricts
the discrimination parameters. The other approach we use as a robustness check and involves restricting
the support of the priors on some ideal points. We present these after having discussed the data.
3 The data
We study the voting records of the monetary policy committee of the Bank of England. This commit-
tee is classified as individualistic in the classification scheme of Blinder (2007). Such an individualistic
committee is characterized by members who express their opinions and vote accordingly. The important
advantage for our purposes is that ”the vote of an individualistic committee conveys genuine informa-
tion” (Blinder (2007)). This facilitates our analysis as we can safely assume that the votes are in fact
a reflection of the preferences of the voting members. Given the individualistic nature of the monetary
policy committee, the voting records are characterized by a fairly high degree of dissent. In over 60%
of the 190 Monetary Policy Committee meetings held between June 1997 and February 2013, a decision
was taken by non-unanimous votes.
In this paper we drop the unanimous votes as these are uninformative for our purposes. The remaining
votes were coded as decisions over two alternatives. Table 1 clarifies the coding with two examples.
Example 1 is the situation where there were only two policy choices to vote on in a given meeting.
Nickell voted in that particular meeting for a lowering of the interest rate with 25 basis points, whereas
the other voters preferred to keep the interest rate unchanged. In this case Nickell chose for the dovish
option so his vote is coded as 0, whereas the others chose the hawkish choice and therefor their vote is
coded as 1. If a meeting involved a choice with more than two interest rates, we coded these as a series
of choices over pairwise alternatives. Consider Example 2 in Table 1. At this meeting, Walton voted in
favor of raising the policy rates by 25 basis points, Nickell voted in favor of lowering the policy rate by 25
basis points and the other voters preferred to keep the rate unchanged. We coded these once as a choice
between lowering or maintaining the interest rate (coded as 0) and raising the interest rate (coded as 1).
We coded these votes a second time but now as a choice between lowering the interest rate (coded as 0)
and maintaining or raising it (coded as 1).
[Table 1 about here.]
The unprocessed dataset contains the votes of 32 Monetary Policy Committee members at 190 meet-
ings. We recoded the recorded votes in the way described above. We dropped the unanimous meetings.
Subsequently we dropped voting records of the Monetary Policy members we observe less than three
times. This leaves us with 117 meetings and 29 Monetary Policy Committee members, henceforward re-
ferred to as voters.7 Not all voters vote at each meeting. Since the Monetary Policy Committee contains
at most nine voters, we can at most observe nine votes at each meeting. The 29-by-117 matrix of votes
is in fact mostly empty and only 1038 entries are filled.
[Figure 2 about here.]
In Figure 2 on the horizontal axis we have the total votes cast and on the vertical axis the number of
votes we coded as dovish for a given voter. The straight line indicates the combinations where exactly
7From here onwards we use the term meeting for one recorded voting session in our dataset. This means that a real
monetary policy meeting could occupy two meetings in our dataset when three policy choices were considered. The uncoded
data did not contain records of votes where four or more policy choices were considered.
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half of the votes is coded as being hawkish and half the votes is coded as being dovish. The graph
shows that there is a wide variation in the number of votes we observe for the different voters. We have
117 votes of Mervyn King in our data set while we have only 10 votes of David Walton. In the graph
we labeled five voters which we use as a reference throughout this paper. As mentioned, King has the
largest number of votes of which more than half are classified as hawkish. Sentance is another example
of someone who has voted predominantly hawkish, Blanchflower on the other hand voted exclusively
dovish. Nickell and Buiter seem to have a centrist voting record.
3.1 Outliers and few observations: a robust modification
Before proceeding to the empirical analysis we would like to motivate and present a modification of
the standard spatial model. The model we presented in 2.1 has quickly become the standard approach
for estimating ideal points of legislators.8
The data we have in the context of Monetary Policy Committees are more limited than the roll
call data available to researchers investigating votes in the U.S. Senate or Congress for which these
methods were developed. Consider for example the seminal article by Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers
(2004) where the authors fit the standard spatial voting model to the roll calls from the 106th U.S.
House of representatives. This gives the authors 444.326 individual voting decisions. Compare this with
our sample of only 1038 individual voting decisions and the substantial variation in number of observed
votes for each voter.
But there is another problem. Logit and probit models are not robust to outliers. This was already
shown by Pregibon (1982) and more recently by Liu (2004). In this context the term outlier refers to an
observation of an outcome that is highly unexpected given the linear predictor. Bafumi, Gelman, Park,
and Kaplan (2005) provide the following example. Say we have estimated a logit model P (yi = 1) =
logit−1(Xiβ) and we have for a particular observation i, Xiβ̂ = 10. Then logit
−1(10) = 0.99995 so the
observation yi = 0 would be an outlier. The many missing entries in our votes matrix and the fact that
we observe only a limited number of votes for some voters potentially aggravate the problem of outliers.
Only a few outliers could substantially bias our parameter estimates.
A modification to the standard voting model to become more robust against outliers (in the sense
explained earlier) is proposed in Bafumi, Gelman, Park, and Kaplan (2005). To understand this, consider
the basic model we derived earlier (see equation 1). Bafumi, Gelman, Park, and Kaplan (2005) propose
to add a level of error ε0 and ε1 as follows:
P (ynt = 1) = ε0 + (1− ε0 − ε1)logit−1(βtxn − αt). (3)
Now, every voter has an immediate probability of success ε0 and of failure ε1. The initial item-response
model applies then to the remaining outcomes. This simple modification makes the standard spatial
voting model more robust and is straightforward to implement. When we do model checking (see 4.2) we
are going to explicitly compare the performance of this modified model presented here with the standard
spatial voting model we presented earlier.
8The canonical method for inferring ideal points was based on an unfolding procedure called NOMINATE developed
in Poole and Rosenthal (1985) and subsequent work. In recent years the Bayesian approach of estimating ideal points has
become the preferred method. Without going into detail on the comparison we mention two important reasons for choosing
the Bayesian approach. First of all, the NOMINATE algorithm requires us to drop certain voters and meetings because
they are inappropriate for the algorithm (too few votes or too lopsided meetings). So this approach yields a less complete
picture in the application we consider. Second the Bayesian approach facilitates inference over derived quantities. We make
use of this in further sections of this paper. A classic introduction to the Bayesian statistics of the standard spatial model
as presented here is Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers (2004).
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3.2 Priors
Our approach is Bayesian. In the literature on ideal points the local identification approach as we
outlined earlier is considered to be the least restrictive. We follow this approach and choose therefore
standard normal priors for the ideal points. However we then still need to fix the dove-hawk direction,
see our discussion in 2.2. We propose two different ways of doing this so we can compare the resulting
ideal points and ensure that our empirical analysis is not sensitive to the assumptions we make in order
to achieve global identification. The two different sets of priors are summarized in Table 2.
[Table 2 about here.]
Our preferred choice of priors to which we refer to as the baseline prior choice ensures that the
discrimination parameters βt cannot be negative. Remember that we coded votes as 0 or 1 where in each
given meeting a vote coded as zero was the most dovish (the least restrictive) of two proposed policy
rates. Restricting βt to nonnegative values then makes sense. It implies that we explicitly model the
directionality of each vote which is clear in this application. We restrict βt to be nonnegative by choosing
for each βt a diffuse normal prior with a positive mean, but which is truncated at zero.
9 When we present
different model checks, we show a straightforward way to check this assumption (see subsection 4.1). For
the vote-difficulty parameters αt we also choose diffuse priors. The prior choice for ε0 and ε1 follow the
recommendations of Bafumi, Gelman, Park, and Kaplan (2005). This prior choice restricts the values
of these parameters to lie in the interval [0, 0.1]. This is not restrictive because if we would find values
which are close to 0.1, suggesting an immediate chance of success or failure of 10%, then a logit-type
model should not even be used as an approximation, see Bafumi, Gelman, Park, and Kaplan (2005).
The alternative prior choice relaxes the assumption on the discrimination parameters. We do not truncate
the normal distribution and so the discrimination parameters could take on negative values. To achieve
global identification we restrict the support of the priors of certain ideal points of voters which are obvious
candidates for being hawk or dove. Specifically we restrict the ideal points of Wadhwani and Blanchflower
to be negative and the ideal points of Large and Sentance to be positive. This seems reasonable since
we coded 22 of the 24 votes by Wadhwani in our dataset as 0 and all 26 votes by Blanchflower. At
the other hand we coded 38 of the 40 votes by Sentance and 22 of the 24 votes by Large as 1. Just as
with the baseline prior, we can check the reasonableness of this prior. In the appendix to this paper we
also present results of a thorough sensitivity analysis where we look at the sensitivity of our findings to
alternative prior choices. We do this by starting with our preferred model (equation 3) with the baseline
prior choice and then specifying different priors for the parameters. We re-estimate the model with four
alternative specifications. We conclude from these tests that our results are robust.
Simulation from the posterior is done by means of slice sampling, see Neal (2003), as implemented in
the MCMCpack package, see Martin, Quinn, and Park (2011) for details. The MCMC algorithm ran for
330,000 iterations. We discarded the first 30,000 draws and thinned the remaining iterations by a factor
30 to keep 10,000 draws. Standard convergence tests suggested convergence and good mixing. In the
appendix to this paper we report these diagnostics.
4 Ideal points at the Bank of England
We start by estimating the ideal points of the Monetary Policy Committee members with the robust
model (see equation 3) and the baseline constraints. Figure 3 presents the ideal points of the 29 voters
along with the uncertainty in the estimates.
9Cromwell’s rule states that if a particular region of the parameter space has zero prior probability then it also has
zero posterior probability, see Jackman (2009). So by restricting the support of the prior to the positive real line we have
in fact restricted the βt parameters to be nonnegative.
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Inspection of the figure shows that we could roughly classify the monetary policy members as follows.
For Blanchflower, Wadhwani, Julius, Allsopp and Nickell we find that the 95% intervals do not overlap
with zero and so we would classify them as doves. Likewise the group of hawks consists of Sentance,
Besley, Large, Budd, Weale, Dale, King, Buiter and Vickers. For the latter two we find 95% intervals
The other voters are classified as centrist. In this group we find that for Fisher, Posen, Miles and Bell
the 95% credible interval overlaps barely with zero and we would be inclined to label these as dovish as
well.
[Figure 3 about here.]
Before we proceed with exploring various ideas on the voting behavior of the monetary policy com-
mittee members it is important to verify that the estimation results pass some checks. These checks give
an insight in how well the model fits the data and what the impact of certain assumptions are. Moreover
the model checks may enhance the understanding of the ideal-point methodology. The idea of model
checking is not unique to Bayesian data analysis and has been used by researchers working with complex
stochastic models in a variety of fields.10
In the following subsection we undertake three checks. We start by gauging the impact of the identifying
constraints (the constraint on the discrimination parameters) in our preferred specification. We find
that the constraints are reasonable and do not contrast with the data. Then we compare the model
specification we prefer, that is the simple modification as given in Equation 3, with the standard spatial
model. We show that the robust modification gives results which are less sensitive to the prior choice.
This check shows that our results do not depend on the identifying assumption we make. Additionally
it provides evidence in favor of our specification choice over the standard spatial model. Both these
checks give an insight in respectively the impact of our prior and our model choice. Then we investigate
prediction errors. These provide a more rigorous idea of the model fit.
4.1 The constraints on the priors
Our baseline prior constrains βt to be positive. This constraint on the discrimination parameter is
justified from a theoretical point of view.11 In our framework, when given the choice between a lower and
a higher policy rate, someone who is more hawkish should be more inclined to choose the higher policy
rate than someone who is less hawkish. Here we check whether this is supported by the data. There
are two reasons why we could find a negative discrimination parameter when we would not explicitly
constrain the discrimination parameter as we do in our baseline prior choice. First of all we could have
miscoded the data. As such investigating the negative discrimination parameters under the alternative
prior offers an additional check of the data. Secondly, negative discrimination parameters may result
because of switching coalitions. When hawkish voters vote in the dovish direction or dovish voters vote
in the hawkish direction this situation can arise. In Figure 4 we plot the posterior estimates of the
discrimination parameters. In the left graph we plot the estimates from our model with the baseline
prior and in the right graph from the model under the alternative prior choice. The left graph shows
that a few discrimination parameters are close to zero under the baseline prior choice. The right plots
reveals which discrimination parameters are suspect in particular. We see that when we put a constraint
on the discrimination parameters, some would take on negative values. The graph shows that these
negative discrimination parameters are clustered. Most of the negative discrimination parameters fall
10 An insightful reference discussing the philosophical aspects and containing plenty of references is Gelman and Shalizi
(2013). Practical advice and specific procedures on which we draw in this paper are described in Gelman, Goegebeur,
Tuerlinckx, and Van Mechelen (2000), Gelman, Carlin, Stern, and Rubin (2003) and Bafumi, Gelman, Park, and Kaplan
(2005).
11See also the discussion on constraining the discrimination parameter in Hix, Hoyland, and Vivyan (2010).
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in a period which coincides with the tenure of Willem Buiter. After having developed a more hawkish
voting profile, he voted in a number of meetings for the dovish choice whereas the majority of the other
members, including those who tend to be more dovish, voted for the hawkish option. This explains why
the discrimination parameter is negative in the unconstrained specification. Our baseline specification
does not allow for negative discrimination parameters and puts a value close to zero on these particular
meetings. The interpretation is that in this model the votes in these meetings do not reflect the latent
policy preferences of the voters. Overall, this graph tells us that the constraint on the discrimination
parameter is not in conflict with the data. When unconstrained, few discrimination parameters take on
a substantial negative value.
[Figure 4 about here.]
4.2 Comparing the robust and standard spatial model
To check whether our results do not depend on our prior choice and identification scheme we compare
the estimated ideal points under both identifying prior choices. We do this once for the robust modifica-
tion and once for the standard model. In the left graph of Figure 5 both prior choices are compared for
the robust model. When we obtain the exact same estimates for the ideal points, all dots should lie on
the diagonal. We find that the estimated ideal points are close to the diagonal except for the ideal point
of Willem Buiter. His ideal point depends on the specific prior choices although it remains positive.
[Figure 5 about here.]
We do the same check and compare the ideal points found under both prior choices when we estimate
the standard spatial model. These results can be found in the right graph of Figure 5. We see that
in the standard spatial voting model (without the small modification) the estimates are far less stable.
Several dots lie relatively far away from the diagonal, indicating that the ideal points change according
to the identifying assumption. Some even switch from clearly dovish to clearly hawkish. This supports
our choice for the robust modification.
4.3 Prediction errors
To assess how well our model fits we can inspect prediction errors.12 Define a prediction error pei as:
pei = 1 if E(yi) > 0.5 and yi = 0, or E(yi) < 0.5 and yi = 1
= 0 otherwise. (4)
Using the prediction errors we can quickly check the error rate or the proportion of times the prediction
is wrong. The error rate for our preferred model is slightly over 8%. This can be compared to the error
rate of the null model, the model where we give each outcome a probability equal to the proportion of
1’s in our dataset. The error rate of the null model is 46% so our model fits considerably better.
We can also use the prediction errors to consider the excess error rate i.e. the proportion of errors beyond
what is expected. If the model is true, the probability of error is:
E(ei) = min(ε0 + (1− ε0 − ε1)logit−1(βtxn − αt), 1− (ε0 + (1− ε0 − ε1)logit−1(βtxn − αt))) (5)
which is the minimum of the model’s prediction and 1 minus the prediction. The excess error eei is then:
eei = pei − E(ei). (6)
12This model check follows the suggestions in Bafumi, Gelman, Park, and Kaplan (2005) closely.
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To be able to interpret the prediction errors, we consider averages of errors as these offer 0 as a baseline
Bafumi, Gelman, Park, and Kaplan (2005).
[Table 3 about here.]
In Table 3 we show the excess error rate for the voters. The excess error rates are low suggesting
that we can estimate the ideal points well.13 The ideal points for Buiter and Walton have the highest
excess error rates. We find for both an error rate which is 25% higher than what we would expect if
the model were true. We commented earlier on the voting record of Buiter and so this result should not
come as a surprise. Walton on the other hand is the voter for which we have the fewest observations in
our recoded sample. The posterior distribution of his ideal point was consequently wide and the excess
error rate reflects this uncertainty.
4.4 Data on Asset Purchases
Since March 2009 the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England also votes on asset pur-
chases financed with central bank reserves. We can integrate these voting data in our framework by
coding the votes in a similar way as we did for the policy rate votes. These new vote data provide
additional information to identify the ideal points of the voters. However some remarks are in order.
First, we only have voting data on asset purchases for a limited period, hence only for a subset of voters.
Second, we assume that a vote on the asset purchase program and the policy rate can be used more or
less on equal footing in our spatial voting model. While our model is flexible and gives different weights
to votes in different meetings, this assumption underlies the data construction.
The results of the combined dataset can be found in the appendix to this paper. The most noticeable
changes are related to Miles, Fisher and Posen. The additional votes allow us to discriminate among
these three more clearly. Posen becomes an outspoken Dove. Miles and Fisher are now more centrist
with Fisher leaning more towards the hawkish side than Miles. This makes sense when we look at the
vote data on asset purchases. Posen voted in about 85% of the occasions for the dovish option in asset
purchase decisions (more asset purchases) whereas Fisher did so only about 15% of the time. Miles voted
half the time for the dovish choice and half the time for the hawkish choice.
When we incorporate the data vote data on asset purchases, we find even more support for the empirical
claims we discuss in the remainder of this paper. We choose to present results only based on the votes
with respect to the policy rate to remain conservative. We refer the interested reader to the online
appendix to this paper where we comment in detail on the the results when vote data on asset purchases
are also used.
5 Internals and Externals
The model checks in the previous section suggest that the model fits well. In this section we use
our results to investigate whether groups of members systematically differ in their policy preferences.
First we consider the differences between internals and externals, that is internal members who have a
full-time executive position at the Bank and external members who have no executive responsibilities.
Besley, Meads, and Surico (2008) make the same distinction. Harris, Levine, and Spencer (2011) split the
monetary policy committee members in three groups distinguishing between external members, internal
13For a reference on the size of error rates we can expect, see Bafumi, Gelman, Park, and Kaplan (2005) where the
authors report excess error rates varying from -0.20 to +0.20 with outliers over 0.5. Additionally we could use the estimated
parameters to generate reference excess errors based on replicated data. Such an exercise is reported in the appendix to
this paper. The results of the comparison of the realized errors to the reference errors confirm the conclusion that only the
ideal points of Buiter and Walton have a remarkable excess error rate.
12
members who are politically appointed and internal members who are not politically appointed. In Table
4 we provide an overview of all the monetary policy committee members we consider in our analysis as
well as some information on career backgrounds. The info in this table comes from Harris, Levine, and
Spencer (2011) which we updated for the monetary policy committee members who joined after 2007.14
The classification requires some judgement calls. We tried to only take major appointments into account
and so we disregarded consulting roles or special advisory positions.
[Table 4 about here.]
At first sight it seems that externals and internals do not seem to be easily classified as either dovish
or hawkish. As can be seen in Figure 3, outspoken doves such as Blanchflower and Wadhwani as well
as clear hawks such as Sentance and Besley both belong to the external group. What does seem to be
the case is that the internals tend to take the centrist position. Of the politically appointed internal
members only Large and King are hawks. Also the other internally appointed members tend to take
the centrist position and only Dale has a hawkish ideal point. Remarkably all the doves belong to the
external group. These conclusions all stem from looking at Figure 3. To verify that indeed the external
members have the most outspoken ideal points, we want to infer the ranks of the estimated voting scores.
Our Bayesian simulation results facilitate this analysis. As explained in Jackman (2009), given the joint
posterior density over the ideal points x = (x1, . . . , x29) we can induce a posterior density over any
quantity of interest that is a function of the x.
5.1 The most dovish and hawkish voters
To obtain a posterior density over the order statistics for each voter we use the following procedure.15




1 , . . . , x
(k)
29 and assign a rank
r to the sampled ideal points. Denote the ranks r at each iteration of the MCMC algorithm as r(k) =
(r
(k)
1 , . . . , r
(k)
29 )
′. Each element of r(k) is an integer r
(k)
n ∈ {1, . . . , 29}. The probability that voter n




n By computing these ranks over the iterations of our sample, we
compute a posterior mass function over the possible ranks.
We now consider only rank 1 and rank 29 we obtain the probability of being the most dovish and the
most hawkish for each voter. Table 5 reports all the voters for whom we find a non-zero probability of
being the most dovish or the most hawkish. If we consider the voters with a probability of being the
most dovish than we see that only Fisher does not belong to the group of external members. Similarly
we find that for the group of voters who have non-zero probability of being the most hawkish, only
Vickers and Large are internal members. Taken together our analysis suggests that the most dovish and
most hawkish members at the monetary policy committee of the Bank of England so far were externals.
Internal members tend to occupy more the middle ground.
[Table 5 about here.]
To our knowledge this observation is new in the literature. Moreover it sheds light on a topic which
has been heavily discussed in the literature. In line with what we have found, Besley, Meads, and Surico
(2008) and Hix, Hoyland, and Vivyan (2010) could not classify external or internal members as either
more dovish or more hawkish. Our ideal point estimates and rank estimations make clear why. In contrast
some studies do claim systematic differences internal and external members. In particular that internals
tend to be more hawkish than external members. Bhattacharjee and Holly (2010) found that internals
are hawkish. However this difference in findings is attributable to the data they use. Their sample ends
14We thank Christoper Spencer for providing background on the original classification and advice on the update.
15See also Jackman (2009), chapter 9.
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in 2005 and does not contain the voting records of external voters we found to be very hawkish such
as Tim Besley or Andrew Sentance. Also Gerlach-Kristen (2009) suggests that external members are
more dovish but here results also rest on shorter sample. Recent work by Hansen, McMahon, and Rivera
(2013) suggests that internals make more precise assessments of the economy and that they tend to be
more hawkish. Our analysis does not shed light on the precision of their assessments but the claim that
internals are more hawkish cannot be confirmed by our analysis.
The estimated ideal points for our clear doves and hawks are well separated from zero and so we are
confident that the conclusions hold. Internals do not vote systematically more hawkish or dovish than
externals. But externals do tend to have members among their ranks with more outspoken policy
preferences. This finding resonates with the views expressed in Gerlach-Kristen (2003) and Harris and
Spencer (2009) that differences between internals and externals could arise because of an organizational
consensus among internals. Related to this, there may be career concerns among internals which are less
relevant for external members. Gerlach-Kristen (2003) suggests that externals may even be incentivized
to gain media attention. Our analysis does not focus on the act of dissenting per se but rather on the
revealed policy preferences. Our results do suggest that internals indeed tend to have policy preferences
which are less heterogenous.
6 Career backgrounds
Related to the differences between internals and externals, we are also interested in career background
effects. The intuition is that career backgrounds may persistently influence the policy preferences of
monetary policy committee members. This notion comes from the literature investigating voting at
the FOMC where such effects have been suggested. The aforementioned study by Harris, Levine, and
Spencer (2011) only finds weak (often counterintuitive) influences of career backgrounds when analyzing
the records of dissents. Besley, Meads, and Surico (2008) consider fewer career background characteristics
when comparing coefficients of reaction functions. They do not find a meaningful pattern.
We investigate the differences in policy preferences by comparing the entire group of voters and the
voters with experience in (1) the finance industry (including banks), (2) industry in general (excluding
the financial industry), (3) government (civil service or working for any government), (4) academia (only
an appointment post doctoral education counts; most voters have obtained a Ph.D.), (5) at the Bank
of England, (6) at an NGO. An overview is provided in Table 4. These groups overlap so some voters
belong to multiple groups.
We compare these groups by comparing the median voters within each group. For each iteration k in
the MCMC algorithm we rank the voters within the different groups and select the median voter of
group l = 1, . . . , 7 (the six subgroups listed above and the entire group of voters). Let x
(k)
l,med denote the
ideal point of the median voter of group l in iteration k. We then have for each group l a sample of
10.000 simulation draws of the ideal point of the median voter. Similar to our earlier inferences we can
construct an estimate of the median voter ideal point and corresponding uncertainty. In the left graph
of Figure 6 we present the ideal points of the seven median voter ideal points. The median voters of
the six subgroups we listed above and the median voter of the entire group (all voters in our dataset).
The figure reveals that the median voter from the group with industry experience is more hawkish than
the median voters of the other groups, including the overall median voter. Monetary Policy Committee
members with NGO experience tend to be a bit more dovish but they are only distinguishable from the
group with industry experience. Harris, Levine, and Spencer (2011) found that industry experience and
work experience at the Bank of England promote tightness dissents -both findings were deemed to be
counterintuitive. Our findings suggest while we find a more hawkish policy preference among those with
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industry experience, those with work experience at the Bank of England do not hold more hawkish policy
preferences. Experience in government, academia or in finance does not seem to systematically shift the
policy preferences. These results are in line with Harris, Levine, and Spencer (2011) and Besley, Meads,
and Surico (2008) who could not find systematic differences in the estimated parameters of reaction
functions when comparing voting members with academic experience and without.
We also consider the heterogeneity in policy preferences in the different groups. To do this we estimate
the dispersion of ideal points in the different groups with a procedure similar to our estimations of the
median voters in each group. For each iteration k, we calculate for each group l the standard deviation
of ideal points, std
(k)
l . The results can be found in the right graph of Figure 6.
[Figure 6 about here.]
We find that there is a larger heterogeneity among the monetary policy committee members with
a background in the industry and academia than those with career experience in a central bank or at
the government. To estimate the probability that the heterogeneity in group A, stdA, is larger than in
group B, stdB , we can generate a binary variable D
(k)
A>B which takes the value of 1 when stdA > stdB
and zero otherwise. We can then compute the probability that the heterogeneity in group A is then






A>B . The results of this calculation indicate that
the heterogeneity among voters with an academic background is larger than the heterogeneity among
(i) voters with a background at a central bank (> 99%), (ii) voters with a career background at the
government (> 99%), (iii) voters with an NGO background (> 98%), (iv) voters with a background in
the financial industry (> 93%). The heterogeneity among the voters with a background in the industry
is the largest but it should be noted here that this group is very small compared to the other groups.
These findings align well with the findings on internal and external members. Voters with an academic
background are predominantly found among the external members. Earlier we showed that this group
tends to have more extreme policy preferences. When we look at the background of the voters (Table 4)
mentioned in Table 5 we find that these are often voters with an academic background. One explanation
could be that academics may have developed an own, idiosyncratic view on what monetary policy should
do and are subsequently more pronounced in their opinions and preferences. Voters with other career
backgrounds, be it in government, at a central bank or in the financial industry, may share a sort of
consensus view and hence have less heterogenous policy preferences.
7 Conclusion
The spatial voting model provides an appealing way of inferring policy preferences from voting records.
This approach has widespread acceptance in research outside of economics. This paper introduces a
Bayesian approach to estimate the spatial voting model and to study the voting behavior of the monetary
policy committee of the Bank of England. We start by focusing on the differences between internals
and externals, a topic which is has been discussed in many papers. We find that it is not the case
that internals are more hawkish than externals (or vice versa). This finding is in line with the results
reported by Besley, Meads, and Surico (2008), Hix, Hoyland, and Vivyan (2010) but contradicts Gerlach-
Kristen (2009), Bhattacharjee and Holly (2010) and Hansen, McMahon, and Rivera (2013). Our ideal
point estimates strongly suggest that the most dovish and the most hawkish positions on the dove-hawk
dimension are occupied by externals. This stands in contrast to the above cited papers who find that
internals tend to be more hawkish than externals. We also investigate whether voting members with
different career backgrounds tend to hold different policy preferences. To evaluate this, we divide all
monetary policy members in different categories according to their career backgrounds. We compare the
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median voter policy preference for each category of the monetary policy committee members. We find
that the median voter in each of these categories is very similar (and similar to the overall median voter)
except for those with career experience in the industry. We subsequently compare the heterogeneity
in policy preferences in different groups. We find that monetary policy committee members with a
background in academia and the industry exhibit a large heterogeneity in policy preferences. In contrast,
monetary policy committee members with a central bank background exhibit the lowest heterogeneity
in preferences. An overview of the literature on voting at central banks by Sibert (2006) suggests that
central banks committees should be designed such that members do not act as part of a group, perhaps by
including members from outside the central bank. Our findings resonate with this suggestion as we find
that indeed members with career experience at the central bank tend to exhibit the lowest heterogeneity
in preferences. In contrast, academics (predominantly found among externals) have more differing policy
preferences than other groups (except for those with an industry background), a finding which is new
to our knowledge. These results are important in the debate on the relevance (or advantage) of having
externals in a central bank committee. The Bank of England is known to be an individualistic monetary
policy committee. Our results suggest that within our sample, the academics have the highest degree
of individualism in central bank committees. In so far this is desirable in the constitutional design of
central bank committees our findings can be helpful.
The methodology is versatile. We can modify the model in a variety of ways. In the paper we
proposed a small modification to make the model more robust but other modifications are conceivable
and may provide avenues for further research.
Another modification to deal with unpredictable voters was suggested by Lauderdale (2010). It is also
possible to relax some of the assumptions of the spatial voting model. The model can be made dynamic
as in Martin and Quinn (2002) although this poses some demands on the data which may be hard to
satisfy. Another extension considers more than one dimension to score central bank committee members.
A justification for an additional latent dimension, e.g. a gradualism-activism dimension lies in the notions
of instrument costs and fear of reversals.16 Instrument costs arise when extensive use of the policy
instrument (changing the policy) is perceived to be costly. Fear of reversals refers to the notion that
cutting the policy rate and raising it the month afterwards (or vice versa) shows lack of consistency or
suggests that the policy change in the previous month was a mistake. Both instrument costs and fear
of reversals induce a central banker to proceed cautious. In our analysis of the Bank of England we
restricted ourselves to one latent dimension. We are aware that many central bankers oppose to the
dove-hawk view often held by central bank watchers. King (2010) makes this feeling explicit: Indeed,
for ten years, I was, to my frustration, regularly described as a hawk. But I am neither hawk nor dove.
Everyone on the Committee votes according to his or her judgement of the outlook for the economy. It
is understandable that central bankers oppose to a reduction to a simple dove-hawk story. However our
statistical analysis suggests that the voting process is well described by a single dove-hawk dimension.
The unidimensional model presented in this paper, predicts the observed votes at the Bank of England
with an accuracy of nearly 92%. In terms of fit, the room for improvement is low. Increasing the number
of latent dimensions seems appealing but it makes modeling the voting process more complex while
there is limited scope for improving the classification of votes. The individual error rates enforce this
viewpoint. The record of most voters is near perfectly classified using a single dimension. The model
is however stylized and the ideal points on the single latent dimension are thus to be interpreted as
a mix of different influences which combine into a useful summary of the policy preference of voters.
Exploring additional latent dimensions may come at the cost of additional identifying assumptions and
a proliferation of parameters which obscures interpretation.
16We thank Willem Buiter for an insightful discussion on these matters.
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The Bayesian ideal-point methodology delivers the joint probability of all parameters and hence
we can quickly devise tests and explores ideas. As an example, in this paper we investigated whether
the heterogeneity varies in groups of voters with different career backgrounds. We could estimate the
heterogeneity (measured by the standard deviation of ideal points) while accounting for the uncertainty
in the estimates of ideal points. We obtained uncertainty in this measure of heterogeneity and could
quickly verify whether the heterogeneity in one group is larger than in another group. The underlying
idea is easily amenable to explore other hypotheses.
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Figure 1: This figure illustrates equation 2. On the latent dove-hawk dimension two ideal points x1, x2
(voters) and two vote-difficulty parameters α1, α2 (meetings) are shown. If the ideal point of Voter n is
larger than the vote-difficulty parameters αt, then it is more likely that Voter n votes for the hawkish





















































Votes by individual voters: overview
Figure 2: Here we present for each voter the total number of votes (horizontal axis) versus the number
of votes coded as the dovish choice. The straight line indicates the combinations where exactly 50% of
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Figure 3: This figure is a graphical representation of the estimated ideal points of the monetary policy
committee members. A point indicates the estimate of the ideal point, the thin line represents the 95%
credible interval.
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Figure 4: These graphs presents the estimates of the discrimination parameters βt, plotted across meet-
ings. The left graph shows the estimates under the baseline prior choice and the right graph under
the alternative prior choice. Under the alternative prior choice, the discrimination parameters are not









































































































Figure 5: In these graphs we compare the ideal points found under the baseline prior choice (horizontal
axis) and the alternative prior choice (vertical axis). When the ideal points are exactly the same under
both prior choices, the dots should all lie on the 45 degree line. The further away from this line, the
more the estimate is sensitive to the choice of prior. In the left graph this comparison is presented for
the robust spatial voting model. All dots are close to the diagonal line except for the ideal point of
Buiter. The right graph displays the comparison for the standard spatial voting model. We see that the
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Figure 6: In the left graph we present the ideal point of the median voter of different groups of voters. In
the right graph we present the dispersion of ideal points. The dot represents the median of the posterior
distribution, the line represents the 95% credible interval. The groups of voters are constructed according
to the career backgrounds displayed in Table 4. Voters may belong to multiple groups.
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Example 1: April 6 2006 Example 2: May 4 2006
Name Vote Casted Coded once as Vote Casted Coded once as Coded a second time as
King +0 1 +0 0 1
Lomax +0 1 +0 0 1
Tucker +0 1 +0 0 1
Bean +0 1 +0 0 1
Barker +0 1 +0 0 1
Nickell -0.25 0 -0.25 0 0
Walton +0 1 +0.25 1 1
Gieve +0 1 +0 0 1
Table 1: This table explains how the data were coded. Example 1 shows the situation where there were
only two alternatives favored. In Example 2, votes were split among three policy choices.
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Parameter Baseline Prior Alternative Prior
ε0 ∼ Uniform(0, 0.1) ∼ Uniform(0, 0.1)
ε1 ∼ Uniform(0, 0.1) ∼ Uniform(0, 0.1)
αt ∼ N(0, 4) ∼ N(0, 4)
βt ∼ N(1, 4) truncated at 0 ∼ N(1, 4)
xn ∼ N(0, 1) ∼ N(0, 1)
with xBlanchflower, xWadhwani truncated above at 0
with xLarge, xSentance truncated below at 0
Table 2: This table provides an overview of the two sets of prior choices we work with throughout the
paper. Our preferred choice is labeled as baseline prior. The alternative prior serves as a check.
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Voter Excess error rate Voter Excess error rate Voter Excess error rate
George -0.13 King -0.09 Lomax -0.07
Large -0.09 Tucker -0.07 Bean -0.14
Barker -0.07 Nickell 0.04 Allsopp -0.16
Bell -0.02 Lambert -0.18 Budd -0.12
Buiter 0.25 Goodhart -0.16 Vickers -0.11
Julius -0.07 Wahwani -0.01 Plenderleith -0.04
Clementi -0.13 Walton 0.25 Gieve -0.03
Blanchflower -0.03 Besley 0.03 Sentance -0.08
Dale -0.22 Fisher -0.02 Miles -0.02
Posen -0.02 Weale -0.21
Table 3: This table reports the excess error rates for the voters as defined in the text. An excess error rate
refers to the proportion of errors beyond what would be expected given the the parameter predictions of
the model. The largest excess error rates (Buiter and Walton) are in bold.
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Name Internal or Political or Finance Industry Government Academia Bank NGO
External Non-political
George, Eddie Internal Political N N N N Y Y
King, Mervyn Internal Both N N N Y Y N
Clementi, David Internal Political Y N N N N N
Large, Andrew Internal Political Y Y Y N N N
Lomax, Rachel Internal Political N N Y N N Y
Gieve, John Internal Political N N Y N N N
Plenderleith, Ian Internal Non-political N N N N Y Y
Dale, Spencer Internal Non-political N N N N Y N
Fisher, Paul Internal Non-political N N N N Y N
Vickers, John Internal Non-political N N N Y N N
Bean, Charles Internal Non-political N N Y Y N N
Tucker, Paul Internal Non-political Y N N N Y N
Buiter, Willem External Political N N N Y N N
Goodhart, Charles External Political N N Y Y Y N
Julius, DeAnne External Political N Y N Y N Y
Budd, Sir Alan External Political Y N Y Y N N
Wadhwani, Sushil External Political Y N N Y N N
Nickell, Stephen External Political N N N Y N N
Allsopp, Christopher External Political N N N Y Y N
Barker, Kate External Political N Y N N N N
Bell, Marian External Political Y N Y N N N
Lambert, Richard External Political Y N N N N N
Walton, David External Political Y N N N N N
Blanchflower, David External Political N N N Y N N
Besley, Tim External Political N N N Y N N
Sentance, Andrew External Political N Y N Y N N
Weale, Martin External Political N N N Y N N
Miles, David External Political Y N N Y N N
Posen, Adam External Political N N N Y Y N
Table 4: The information provided in this table draws upon tables provided by Harris, Levine, and
Spencer (2011) and Hansen, McMahon, and Rivera (2013) which we updated for members who joined
the monetary policy committee after May 2007. Y (N) stands for Yes (No) and means that the monetary
policy member does (not) have career experience in that sector. Some classifications required judgement
calls. In particular we classified Weale and Posen to have academic experience. Weale spent time at the
NIESR which we consider to be an academic institution. Similarly we labeled Posen’s experience at the
Peterson Institute, combined with his publication record as academic experience.
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Voter Probability of being the most dovish Voter Probability of being the most hawkish
Blanchflower ∼ 47% Sentance ∼ 65%
Wadhwani ∼ 32% Besley ∼ 23%
Julius ∼ 16% Large ∼ 11%
Fisher < 2% Budd < 1%
Miles < 2% Buiter < 1%
Posen < 2% Walton < 1%
Allsopp < 1% Vickers < 1%
Bell < 1%
Table 5: This table reports the probability of being the most dovish and being the most hawkish. Policy
preferences are estimated with uncertainty. Small voting histories and lop-sided voting records induce
uncertainty. Our ranking of voters incorporates this and for each rank we have a probability mass
distribution. In this table we report the voters for which we found a non-zero probability of being the
most dovish or the most hawkish, based on our preferred model and 10.000 draws from our MCMC
algorithm.
30
